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Role Conflict: Society’s Dilemma with Excellence in Marketing 
 
Robert W. Nason 
J. Scott Armstrong 
 
In recent years, the American market system has come under increasing criticism from those it serves. Many 
young people, radicals, members of minority groups and even middle-of-the-roaders are concerned about such 
things as poor product quality, poor variety, unsafe products. and misleading advertising. From almost any vantage 
point, flaws in the American economic system are visible. 
 
The flaws are of such magnitude that many even question the overall value of the market system. For example, 
in a speech to the Sales Executives Club of New York, marketing researcher Daniel Yankelovich noted that his 
studies have shown that the public’s confidence in business’s ability to achieve a good balance between “profit 
seeking” and “service to the public” has declined sharply from a 56 per cent average in recent years through 1969 to 
29 per cent in l970. 1 
 
Despite the mounting criticism, marketing goes on as usual. Marketers tend to discard the criticisms as being 
exaggerated. Grey Matter, a publication of Grey Advertising, Inc., extols: 
 
Among the millions of people engaged in production and distribution there are sure to be rascals 
who seek to prey on the public. The guts issues today are: should the whole business world be 
smeared because of some miscreants? And what does such tarring do to our economy?2 
 
Similar pacification is offered by James M. Roche, recent Chairman of the General Motors Corporation: 
 
The dull cloud of pessimism and distrust that some have cast over free enterprise . . . makes it 
urgent that those of us who are in business, who have made business our career, who are 
justifiably proud of our profession, that we stand up and be counted. It is up to us to reaffirm our 
belief in free enterprise.3 
 
The education of marketers generally assumes that the problems could be eliminated if we would just “try a 
little harder.” Marketing textbooks usually devote their first chapter to the need for considering society as a whole –
but this chapter generally has no relationship to the rest of the book where the nature and scope of marketing 
decisions are discussed. 
 
In this paper we express a point-of-view. It is our basic premise that it is not the free market which has failed; 
rather, it is the largely premeditated departures from the free market which have been the major source of the 
problems. Furthermore, we shall argue that the major pressure for these departures comes not from outside the 
system but from within. As Walt Kelly’s Pogo once noted, “We have met the enemy and they is us.” 
 
The crux of the problem revolves about the role (or the set of prescribed behavior) for the marketing manager. 
The firm’s definition of this role seems to be in conflict with the role as it should be defined to best meet the needs 
of society. As a result. the marketing manager whQ attempts to perform well in his role as a marketing manager 
could be doing overall harm to society. In short, there appears to. be a conflict between “excellence in marketing” 
and the “needs of society.”  
 
The conflict between the role of the marketing manager and the needs of society is discussed in the first section 
of the paper. The major concern of the paper is that this role conflict should be recognized. The second section 
                                                 
1 Wall Street Journal (November 24, 1971), 14. 
2 Grey Matter, 42 (7), July 1971, 1. 
3 New York Times, April 11, 1971. 
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provides a discussion of how marketing managers often respond t6this conflict when they strive for excellence under 
the current role definition. The third section of the paper provides a brief review of some of the more promising 
suggestions which have been made to deal with what society considers to be undesirable role behavior by marketing 
managers. 
 
 
Understanding Role Conflict 
 
 The free market is widely acclaimed as the economic cornerstone of American society and it is closely tied to 
the ideals of freedom and individual choice. Marketing managers often make public statements about the value of a 
free market as do government officials. In this paper. we accept the ideology that the free market provides the best 
solution to the economic problem in the United States. That is, it seems to be the best way to satisfy the needs of 
those people in an affluent society.4 
 
While a precise definition of the free market often leads to endless debate. there are certain elements which 
nearly everyone would agree to as being important to the effective operation of a market system. These include: 
 
Free entry of producers 
No collusion among producers 
Useful information for consumers 
Free choice by consumers 
 
The need or the people in a society can be met more efficiently. then. when improvement is made in each of 
these four areas.5 
 
The marketing manager is the chief intermediary between the producers and the consumer. It is the job or the 
marketing manager then to help in identifying the needs of consumers and to help in meeting these needs [ efficient 
manner. Since a free market is also helpful in this regard. it would seem that the marketing manager’s rote should 
(from society’s point of view) be designed to try to promote free entry, to avoid collusion, to provide useful 
information. and to ensure free -choice on the part of consumers. 
 
However, the actual role definition enforces quite the opposite behavior because it is defined to serve 
predominantly one of the many interest groups in the firm-the stockholder. He is viewed as an agent of the 
stockholder and his role is to take actions to “maximize profits.” In short. the role sub-optimizes from the point of 
view of society. The narrowness of this role definition should be apparent. For example, consider that about two-
thirds of the corporate stock in the U.S. is owned by about one percent of the adults.6 
 
What happens then, when a marketing manager takes his role seriously?7 What happens when he strives for 
excellence in his attempt to maximize profits? It turns out that he is rewarded for actions which reduce the 
effectiveness of the free market. He is more successful when he is able to restrict entry of other produders. when he 
colludes with other producers, when he interferes with the flow of useful information to the consumers. and when he 
restricts free choice by the consumers. 
 
In short, there is a conflict between the role of the marketing manager. as currently defined by the firm, and the 
role which would best contribute to the needs of the society. This conflict was documented in the electrical 
conspiracy case of 1961 which involved collusion to fix prices among GE. Westinghouse and 27 other firms. Judge 
                                                 
4 More precisely, it satisfies the needs for those people with wealth. It does not, however, seem to do a good job of 
deciding how the wealth should be distributed. But that’s another problem. 
5 It is possible to construct theoretical arguments where progress on these dimensions would lead to a reduction in 
welfare. Lipsey, R. G. and Lancaster. K. “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of Economic Studies, 24 
(1956-7), 11-32. 
6 Lampman, Robert, The Share of Top Wealth-holders in National Wealth 1922-1956, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962, 209. 
7 Some marketing managers do not live up to their role. They try to maximize their own welfare rather than to 
maximize profits. This simply compounds the negative effect on society. 
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Ganey, at the time of sentencing the marketing executives. said “... I am convinced that in the great number of these 
defendants’ cases, they were torn between conscience and approved corporate policy, with the rewarding objectives 
of promotion, comfortable security, and large salaries.”8 
 
 
Response to the Conflict 
 
 If the marketing manager adopts the current role prescribed by the firm, i.e., to maximize profits, there are two 
possible strategies for “excellence.” These may be referred to as the strategies of the Ox and the Fox. These are 
presented as “extreme” strategies. We do not wish to imply that all marketing managers pursue such strategies 
(although it seems that many do). The point is that the strategies of the Ox and the Fox are rational possibilities for 
those managers who believe that their role is to serve only the stockholders.9 An understanding of these strategies 
may help in isolating effective solutions. 
 
The Ox attempts to increase profits regardless of society’s rules and regulations. He accepts the role prescribed 
by the firm, the yoke as it were, and proceeds directly toward the firm’s goal irrespective of legal or moral 
constraints Thus, he is willing to break the law whenever there is an advantage to do so. He would be willing to 
violate the law to restrict entry of other sellers (e.g., the classic case of Standard Oil where prices were lowered in 
certain areas to drive other producers into bankruptcy;10 to collude with other sellers (e.g., the electrical conspiracy 
case mentioned above); to interfere with the flow’ of useful information (e.g., raise and misleading advertising such 
as Carter’s Little Liver Pills which are now Carter’s Little Pills since they have nothing to do with the liver); and to 
restrict the choice of consumers (e.g.. where the automobile manufacturers colluded to prevent the introduction of 
anti-pollution devices on automobiles).11 
 
The Ox is moderately successful. His major problem is that he cannot always trust his fellow conspirators (for 
example. “cheating” on the collusive agreement was found in the 1960 electrical conspiracy case). Seldom, 
however, is the Ox prosecuted for violation of the law. The penalties imposed by society are very small, implying a 
“boys will be boys” attitude. And the Ox seems to convince himself that the violations of the law are for the benefit 
of society. Consider the statement by F. F. Loock. president of Allen-Bradley Co. of Milwaukee, after he had 
pleaded guilty in the electrical price conspiracy case: 
 
“No one attending the gatherings (in the electrical controls industry) was so stupid he didn’t know 
(the meetings) were in violation of the law. But it is the only way a business can be run. It is free 
enterprise.”12 
 
The above feeling has persisted as indicated by the recent price fixing case of the American Radiator and 
Standard Sanitary Corporation.13 This case involved more severe fines and prison terms than in any other anti-trust 
case since the electrical conspiracy of 1960. Judge Rosenberg pointed out in his refusal to reduce the sentences of 
the executives. the lack of contrition on the part of the defendants. In fact, the defendants seemed to consider 
themselves to be the injured party rather than the public. 
 
Unlike the Ox who is only concerned with enforcement and its severity, the Fox is careful to operate within the 
letter of the law. He attempts to find loopholes in existing laws. If that does not work, he tries to get the law 
changed. The position he takes might be something like the following: 
 
The free market is a wonderful concept. Unfortunately, it sometimes leads to cut-throat 
competition and this is not only bad for business. but also for the consumer. In our particular 
situation (e.g.. steel. automobiles, education, air travel, mail delivery, milk delivery, cutting hair, 
                                                 
8 Brooks, John, Business Adventures, New York: Bantam Books, 1969, 188. 
9 This is usually rationalized by saying that the market will protect the other  groups affected by the firm. 
10 Tarbell, Ida M., The History of Standard Oil Company, New York: McClure. Phillips & Co., 1904. 
11 Mintz, Morton and Cohen, Jerry S., America. Inc., New York: Dial, 1971, Ch 8. 
12 Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1961, 10. 
13 Journal of Marketing, October, 1971, 78-79. 
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helping sick people), the consumer is not adequately protected by the market. We support Bill No. 
xxxx which is designed to help the consumer. 
The Fox may also take action to prevent the passage of laws designed to help the free market (e.g., truth-in-
advertising,  truth-in-lending). If he is not successful in stopping passage of the law, he is often successful in 
rewriting the law “for the benefit of his consumers.” 
 
One of the most successful ways in which the Fox achieves his aims is to try to make the government and the 
public believe that his business is not a business at all – it is a “sport,” “a community of scholars,” a “non-profit 
endeavor,” a “humanitarian service,” or a “necessity for national defense.” 
 
Some of the more successful activities of the Fox include:  
 
(1)  Restricting entry of producers by the American Medical Association in limiting the number of doctors 
who may practice; by the Yellow Cab Company in restricting the number of taxis available; and by the 
oil industry with its tariffs and quotas. (The Texaco 1969 Nine Month Interim Report is not even 
bashful. “. . . Texaco has made its position clear. The domestic producing industry cannot compete on 
an economic basis with the large-volume low-cost oil produced in many foreign areas. Import controls 
must therefore be retained.”) 
 
(2)  Collusion among producers by the football industry in their hiring of players; by stockbrokers in fixing 
commissions; and by the airline industry. The behavior of the American Pharmaceutical Association is 
a case in point. When the Osco Drug chain attempted to post its discount prices in stores which such 
posting was legal. the pharmaceutical Association mounted a massive legal. investigative, and pressure 
campaign principally through state pharmaceutical control boards.14 
 
(3)  Poor and misleading information may continue thanks to the efforts of industry to delay or to 
emasculate the truth-in-lending. truth-in-packaging. and truth-in-advertising laws. Further, for some 
professions advertising is deemed “unprofessional” or “unethical.” Restriction of information surfaces 
in other ways. For example, gas station price signs in Rochester, N.Y. cannot be read from the street 
due to a city ordinance which limits the size of the numerals which can be used. 
 
(4)  Forced or limited choice by consumers for the space program, for elementary education, for 
telephones, for highways. for mail service. and for welfare programs. 
 
 
Some Possible Solutions 
 
This section briefly reviews some of the more promising solutions which have been suggested for dealing with 
the problems created by role conflict in marketing. Recognizing that the Ox and the Fox attempt to introduce 
imperfections into the market, how can these strategies he countered? 
 
Ox-Stoppers: One basic philosophy behind dealing with the strategy of the Ox is to apply punishment. It has 
been suggested, for example, that the marketing manager be held personally responsible for malpractice. Injured 
parties could then take legal action against the manager as well as against the company. Should managers be able to 
purchase malpractice insurance at company expense? 
 
 Another suggestion along the lines of punishment has been to make the firm responsible for the performance of 
its products. The legal system has been moving steadily in this direction. Of particular note is the fact that the value 
of “privity” as a defense has been greatly reduced. That is, the producer cannot avoid responsibility simply because 
he did not sell directly to the injured party. This is true for all but eight states in the U.S.15 
 
Also, producers cannot rely upon a defense based upon “negligence.” That is, it is no longer enough to say that 
“he tried his best” and is therefore free of blame. The trend is towards holding the firm responsible for insuring that 
                                                 
14  Consumers Reports, 27 (3), March 1972, 134-140. 
15  Presser, William L., Handbook of the Law of Torts, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 655. 
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its products and services perform satisfactorily. Class-action suits by consumers would provide an extremely 
effective way to hold the producer accountable for its product in situations where the cost of a lawsuit would be 
prohibitive for an individual consumer.16 There is currently much interest in enabling legislation which would help 
to make class action suits effective. They are currently not effective for marketing problems. (Rheingold says he is 
not aware of any class action suits in product liability.17) 
 
The effectiveness of the punishment philosophy could be improved also by an increase in vigilance by people 
within the firm. Everyone in the firm should be concerned about stopping illegal and unethical activities. The 
marketing manager is in an especially advantageous position to observe illegal and unethical activities. If unethical 
actions not in society’s interest are observed, the individual could try to remedy the situation within the firm. If that 
fails, he could publicly “blow the whistle.” The power of the whistle blower is surprisingly large. Some examples18 
include Jacqueline Verrett, a biochemist with the Food and Drug Administration who angered her superiors by 
appearing on television to warn that cyclamates might cause birth defects; A. Dale Console, a former medical 
director of E. R. Squibb & Sons, who testified before congressional committees about allegedly corrupt practices in 
the drug industry; John Gofman and Arthur Tamplin, two scientists employed at an Atomic Energy Commission 
laboratory. who have charged that existing radiation standards will allow thousands of needless deaths; William I. 
Steiglitz, who resigned as engineering consultant to the National Traffic Safety Agency because he considered 
safety standards “totally inadequate”; A. Ernest Fitzgerald; who lost his job as an Air Force efficiency expert after 
he disclosed cost overruns on the C-5A jet transport to a Senate Committee; Ralph Stein, a former Army intelligence 
specialist who reported the extent of Army surveillance of civilians; and Edward A. Gregory, a General Motors 
inspector who complained about faulty exhaust systems in Chevrolets for more than three years before the company 
finally recalled some 2.4 million vehicles to fix the problem. It should be noted that false exposure can damage 
innocent firms and individuals but this is a risk which coexists with more accurate information and the freedom of 
speech. 
 
The big problem with the whistle-blower is that his commitment to society is likely to cost him and his family 
severe hardship. He gets to make only one major contribution since the behavior which he is protesting is usually 
sanctioned by the organization. Baumhardt19 surveyed executives and concluded from his study that the behavior of 
one’s superior was the most important cause of unethical decisions within the firm. 
 
An example of what happens to the whistle-blower is provided by the case of Henry Durham. an executive for 
Lockheed For a number of years, he attempted to resolve a number of billing and management irregularities 
associated with the production of the C-5A aircraft internally within the company. However. it was not until the 
futility of this effort was obvious through snubs, demotions, and transfers that he took the matter to Senator 
Proxmire. This action invoked the wrath of his company, his church, and his town.20 
 
A recent innovation for this country may help to prolong the life of the whistle-blower. This is the establishment 
of the office of “ombudsman.” The ombudsman represents all interest groups. He is outside of the formal 
organization and does not report to the president or to the board of directors. He works on a fixed-term contract and 
his contract derives its power from the joint consent of at! interest groups.21 The ombudsman is in a position to 
follow up on unlawful or unethical actions which are being taken by a firm or by an industry. The identity of the 
watchdog can be protected much as the shop steward protects the employee in labor complaints. Ralph Nader has 
supported an organization whose function is similar to that of the ombudsman. This organization will handle 
problems for any industry.22 
                                                 
16 Congressional Quarterly, 38 (March 13, 1970), 747-750. 
17 Rheingold. Paul D, “Problems in Multiple Party Litigation.” in Selma Arnold (ed.) Products Liability, New York 
City: Practicing Law Institute, 1971, 171. 
18  Boffey, Philip, “Nader and the Scientists: A Call for Responsibility,” Science, February 12,1971, 549-551. 
19  Baumhardt, Raymond C., “How Ethical Are Businessmen?” Harvard Business Review, 39 (July-August 1961), 
156. 
20  Knoll, Edwin, “The Education of Henry Durham,” The Progressive, January 1972, 19-24. 
21 The term “ombudsman” has been inappropriately used in the public relations efforts of some firms (e.g., Chrysler 
Corporation) to apply to an “assistant-to-the-president.” Gross, Edwin J., “Needed: Consumer Ombudsman,” 
Business and Society, 8 (Autumn 1966), 22-27. 
22 The Clearinghouse for Professional Responsibility, P.O, Box 486, Washington, D.C., 20044. 
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The above ideas represent only a partial listing of ways in which society can stop the Ox. All of these counter 
forces are to some degree currently being used and have the advantage of not requiring major institutional changes. 
The use of these counter forces seems to be growing. 
 
Re-orienting the Fox: Rather than finding ways to stop the Fox, it seems more fruitful to try to re-orient his 
goal. In other words. an effort could be made to change the rewards rather than to use punishment. 
 
In the early 1930’s, there was much discussion over the role of the manager – e.g., see the exchange between 
Berle23 and Dodd.24 Berle claimed that the manager is and should be held responsible only to the stockholder. Dodd, 
on the other hand, suggested that perhaps the law should return to the original notion that the manager is responsible 
to all of the stakeholders in the firm – i.e., to the employees, stockholders, consumers, creditors, suppliers, and local 
community.25 Though there will be conflicts between the groups. on balance, such a change would bring the role of 
the marketing manager more into agreement with the role which is oriented towards the needs of society. Thus, there 
would be less pressure for the manager to use the strategy of the Fox. 
 
There has been little progress since the 1930’s toward the stakeholder role. However, there seems to have been 
a recent revival of interest. An organization known as the Project on Corporate Responsibility was successful in 
getting a proposal before the General Motors stockholders which would have placed representatives of various 
interest groups on the board of directors. While this proposal lost by a substantial margin, it did receive much 
favorable interest among the general public. And in 1972, the Banking Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives was examining the possibility of “legally mandated standards for effective representation on 
corporate boards of stockholder, consumer. general public. and other interests.”26 Such representation is a step in the 
right direction but it must be recognized that current boards are often weak. 
 
A related proposal which might also contribute to changing the role of the marketing manager is that firms 
should develop a system for “social accounting.” This would involve an attempt to objectively measure the impact 
of the firm not only upon its stockholders but also upon the other stakeholders in the firm. Social accounting would 
be useful in helping to focus more attention on those non-financial goals of the firm. It would give mere attention to 
the concerns of the various stakeholders. While social accounting is not a new idea (a discussion can be found in 27), 
it is one which has been receiving a fair amount of attention recently. 
 
Certainly there are other suggestions which might help to improve the effectiveness of the marketing manager. 
However. we feel that the related ideas of a reorientation toward the stakeholders’ role and the use of social 
accounting are especially worth of further consideration.28 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The most important point in the paper is that there is a conflict between the role of the marketing manager as 
currently defined by most firms and the role which would seem most beneficial to society. We think that the society 
                                                 
23 Berle. A. A.. Jr., “Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust.” Harvard Law Review, 44 (1931). 1049-1074. Also, “For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees,” Harvard Law Review, 45 (1932), 1365-l372. 
24 Dodd, E. Merrick, Jr., “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” Harvard Law Review, 45 (1932), 1145-
1163. Also, “Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?” University of 
Chicago Law Review, 2 (1935). 
25 Berle has conceded that Dodd won the argument. He feels that managers are not limited to working toward 
maximum profits. Rather they are recognized in law as “administrators of a community system.” Berle, A. A. Jr., 
“Foreword,” in Edward S. Mason (ed.), The Corporation in Modern Society, New York: Antheneurn. 1969, xxi. 
26  Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1972, 4. 
27  Bowen, Howard R., Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953, 155. 
28  We are, for example, currently involved in some role playing experiments to determine what effects these 
changes would have on decision making within the firm: Armstrong, J. Scott and Majoros. Walter A., “Marketing 
Decisions and Social Responsibility,” paper delivered at the Institute of Management Sciences Meetings, 
Houston, Texas (April 1972). 
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would be served more effectively if the marketing manager were punished rather than rewarded for actions which 
sabotage the free market. Even better, it would seem useful to reorient the role of the marketing manager so that he 
is rewarded for actions which improve the operation of the market – actions which would promote free entry of 
other producers. reduce collusion among producers. promote the flow of useful information to consumers, and 
increase the freedom of choice by consumers. Until this role conflict is recognized. there will remain a dilemma 
between excellence in marketing and the needs of society.  
 
